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Creation and the Theory of Evolution
Abstract
The Boardman Lecture, in cooperation with the Center For Theology and The Natural Sciences and The John
Templeton Foundation, funded a conference on Creation and Theory of Evolution. The conference explored
religion and science by offering two different approaches to the question of human origins. Geneticist
Francisco Ayala explains the present state of our understanding of evolution and argues that such human
phenomena as morality and religion are by-products of the evolutionary process that cannot be explained by
natural selection. His lecture appears as "The Evolutionary Transcendence of Humankind." Dr. Pannenberg
stressed that the God of religious faith must be the Creator of the same nature that is studied by scientists. He
explores aspects of the Genesis creation story that are compatible with the theory of evolution. His lecture is
"Human Life: Creation Versus Evolution?"
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The thirty-fifth Dana Boardman Lecture on Christian Ethics at the 
Univeaity of Pennsylvania was coordinated with funds provided by 
The John Templeton Foundation and the University Lecture Series of 
the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley) so that a 
short conference on Creation and Theory of Evolution could be pre- 
sented. The object was to enrich explorations of religion and science by 
offering two significant and different approaches to the question of 
human origins. 
Noted geneticist Francisco Ayala of the University of California 
(Irvine) explained the present state of our understanding of evolution 
and argued that such human phenomena as morality and religion are 
by-products of the evolutionary process that cannot be explained by 
natural selection. His lecture, after some revisions by the author, 
appears in this publication as "The Evolutionary Transcendence of 
Humankind". 
The Boardman Lecturer, Dr. Wolfhart Pannenberg, a well known 
theologian and Emeritus Professor at the University of Munich, devel- 
oped a theological argument. Dr. Pannenberg stressed that the God of 
religious faith must be the Creator of the same nature that is studied by 
scientists. To illustrate one application of this claim, he explored aspects 
of the Genesis creation story that are compatible with the theory 
of evolution. His lecture "Human Life: Creation Versus Evolution?" 
challenges us to see that "Vistls" need not describe the relationship of 
Creation and Evolution. 
Both Dr. Ayala and Dr. Pannenberg have written extensively on 
questions of science, philosophy and religion. 
I would like to thank Professor Stephen Dunning, who organized the 
conference, for his assistance in preparing this publication. 
Susan Marks 
University of Pennsylvania 
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On June 6, 1899, the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania 
accepted from the Reverend George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D., 
and Mrs. Ella Cove11 Boardman, his wife, a Deed of Gift, providing for 
a foundation to be known as "The Boardman Lectureship in Christian 
Ethics", the income of the fund to be expended solely for the purposes 
of the Trust. Dr. Boardman served the University for twenty-three years 
as Trustee, for a time as Chaplain, and often as Ethical Lecturer. After 
providing for refunding out of the said income, any depreciation which 
might occur in the capital sum, the remainder is to be expected in 
procuring the delivery in each year at the University of Pennsylvania, 
one or more lectures on Christian Ethics from the standpoint of the 
life, example and teachings of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the publi- 
cation in book form, of the said lecture or lectures within four months 
of the completion of their delivery. The volume in which they are print- 
ed shall always have its forefront a printed statement of the history, 
outline, and terms of the Foundation. 
On  July 6, 1899, a Standing Committee on "The Boardman 
~ e c t u r & h i ~  n Christian Ethics" was constituted, to which shall be 
committed the nominations of the lecturers and the publications of the 
lectures in accordance with the Trust. 
On February 6, 1900, on the recommendation of this committee, 
the Reverend George Dana Boardman, D.D., LL.D., was appointed 
Lecturer on Christian Ethics on the Boardman Foundation for the cur- 
rent year. 
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THE BOARDMAN LECTURESHIP IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS: 
THE ORIGINAL OUTLINE WRITTEN BY 
DR. GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN D 
MRS. ELLA COVELL BOARDMAN IN 1899 
I. THE PURPOSE 
First, the purpose is not to trace the history of the various ethical theo- 
ries; this already done in our own noble University. Nor is it the purpose to 
teach theology, whether natural, Biblical, or ecclesiastical. But the purpose 
of this Lectureship is to teach Christian Ethics; that is to say, the practical 
application of the precepts and behavior of JESUS CHRIST to everyday life. 
And this is the greatest of the sciences. It is a great thing to know astron- 
omy; for it is the science of mighty orbs, stupendous distances, majestic 
adjustments in time and space. It is a great thing to know biology; for it is 
the science of living organisms - the starting, growth, health, movements, life 
itself. It is a great thing to know law; for it is the science of legislation, gov- 
ernment, equity, civilization. It is a great thing to know philosophy; for it is 
the science of men and things. It is a great thing to know theology; for it is 
the science of God. But what avails it to know everything in space from atom 
to star, everything in time from protoplasm to Deity, ifwe do not know how 
to manage ourselves amid the complex, delicate ever-varying duties of daily 
life? What will it profit a man if he gain the whole world - the world geo- 
graphical, commercial, political, intellectual, and after all lose his own soul? 
What can a University give in exchange for a Christlike character? Thus it is 
that ethics is the science of sciences. Very significant is the motto of our own 
noble University - "Literae Sine Moribus Vanae". 
And Jesus of Nazareth is the supreme ethical authority. When we come 
to receive from Him our final awards, he will not ask, "What was your the- 
ory of atoms? What did you think about evolution? What was your doctrine 
of atonement? What was your mode of baptism?" But he will ask,"What did 
you do with Me? Did you accept Me as your personal standard of character? 
Were you a practical everyday Christian?" Christian Ethics will be the judge- 
ment test. 
In sum, the purpose of this Lectureship in Christian Ethics is to build up 
human character after the model of Jesus Christ. 
11. RANGE OF THE LECTURESHIP 
Secondly, the Range of the Lectureship. This range should be as wide 
as human society itself. The following is offered in way of general outline 
and suggestive hints, each hint being of course but a specific or technical 
illustration growing out of some vaster underlying Principle. 
1. Man's Heart-Nature. - And, first, man's religious nature. For exam- 
~ l e :  Christian (not merely ethical) precepts concerning man's 
capacity for religion; worship; communion; divineness; immortality; 
duty of religious observances; the Beatitudes; in brief, Manliness in 
Christ. 
2. Man's Mind-Nature. - Secondly, man's intellect-nature. For example: 
Christian precepts concerning reason; imagination; invention; aes- 
thetics; language, whether spoken, written, sung, builded, painted 
chiseled, acted, etc. 
3. Man's Society-Nature. - Thirdly, man's society-nature. 
For example: 
(a) Christian precepts concerning the personal lifk: for instance: con- 
scientiousness, honesty, truthfulness, charity, chastity, courage, 
independence, chivalry, patience, altruism, etc. 
(b) Christian precepts concerning family life; for instance: marriage, 
divorce; duties of husbands, wives, parents, children, kindred, 
servants, place of woman, etc. 
(c) Christian precepts concerning the business life; for instance: 
rights of labor; rights of capital; right of pecuniary independence; 
living within means; life insurance; keeping morally accurate 
accounts; endorsing; borrowing; prompt liquidation; sacredness 
of trust funds, personal and corporate; individual moral respon- 
sibility of directors and officers; trust-combinations; strikes; 
boycotting; limits of speculation; profiting by ambiguities; single 
tax; nationalization of property, etc. 
(d) Christian precepts concerning the civic life; for instance: responsibil- 
ities of citizenship; elective franchise; obligations of office; class- 
legislation; legal oaths; custom-house conscience; sumptuary laws; 
public institutions, whether educational, ameliorative, or reformatory; 
hnction of money; standard of money; public credit; civic refbrms; 
caucuses, etc. 
xvi 
(e) Christian precepts concerning international life; for 
instance: treaties; diplomacy; war; arbitration; disarma- 
ment; tariE reciprocity; mankind, etc. 
(f) Christian precepts concerning ecclesiastical life: for 
instance: sectarianism, comity in mission fields; co-opera- 
tion; unification of Christendom, etc. 
(g) Christian precepts concerning the academic life; for 
instance: literary and scientific ideals, professional stan- 
dards of morality; function of the press; copyrights; oblig- 
ations of scholarship, etc. 
In sum, Christian precepts concerning the tremendous problems 
of sociology, present and future. 
Not that all the lectures must agree at every point; often there are 
genuine cases of conscience, or reasonable doubt, in which a good 
deal can be justly said on both sides. The supreme point is this: 
Whatever the topic may be, the lecturer must discuss it conscien- 
tiously, in light of Christ's own teachings and character; and so awak- 
en the consciences of his listeners, making their moral sense more 
acute. 
4. Man's Body-Nature. - Fourthly, man's body-nature. For 
example: Christian precepts concerning environment; heredity, 
health, cleanliness, temperance; self-control; athletics; public 
hygiene; tenement-houses; prophylactics; the five senses; 
treatment of animals, etc. 
In sum, the range of topics for this Lectureship in Christian 
Ethics should include whatever tends to society-building, or perfec- 
tion of personal character in Christ. Surely, here is material enough, 
and this without any need of duplication, for centuries to come. 
xvii 
111. SPIRIT O F  T H E  LECTURESHIP 
Thirdly, the Spirit of this Lectureship. Every lecture must be presented 
from the standpoint ofJesus Christ. It must be distinctly understood and the 
founder of the Lectureship cannot emphasize the point too strongly, that 
every lecture in these successive courses must be unambiguously Christian; 
that is, from the viewpoint of the Divine Son of Mary. This Lectureship 
must be something more than a lectureship in moral philosophy, or in a 
church theology; it must be a lectureship in Christian morality, or practical 
ethics from the standpoint of Christ's own personal character, example, and 
teachings. 
IV. QUALIFICATIONS O F  T H E  LECTURER 
Fourthly, the Qualification of the Lecturer. The founder hopes that the . 
lecturer may often be, perhaps generally, a layman; for instance: a merchant, 
a banker, a lawyer, a statesman, a physician, a scientist, a professor, an artist, 
a craftsman, for Christian ethics is a matter of daily practical life rather than 
of metaphysical theology. The founder cares not what the ecclesiastical con- 
nection of the lecturer may be: whether Baptist or an Episcopalian, a Quaker 
or a Latinist; for Christian ethics as Christ's behavior is not a matter of eccle- 
siastical ordination or of sect. The only pivotal condition of the Lectureship 
in this particular is this: The lecturer himself must be unconditionally loyal 
to our only King, our Lord Jesus Christ; for Jesus Christ Himself is the 
world's true, everlasting Ethics. 
CREATION 
AND THE 
THEORY OF EVOLUTION 
THE EVOLUTIONARY TRANSCENDENCE 
OF HUMANKIND 
Francisco J. Ayala 
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology 
University of California, Irvine 
9 SETTING THE STAGE 
It does not take a great deal of biolo ical expertise to realize that 
humans have organs and limbs similar to t f ose of other animals; that we 
bear our youn like other mammals; that, bone by bone, there is a pre- 
cise correspon ~7 ence between the skeletons of a chim anzee and a human. 
It also does not take much reflection to notice the 1 istinct uniqueness of 
our species. There is the bipedal gait and the enlarged brain. Much more 
conspicuous than the anatomical differences are the distinct behaviors 
and their outcomes. Humans have elaborate social and political institu- 
tions, codes of law, literature and art, ethics and religion; humans build 
roads and cities, travel by motorcars, ships and airplanes, and communi- 
cate by means of telephones, com uters and televisions. 
I will first, in the ages that fo low, set forth the biological continuity B f between humans an animals. I outline what we currently know about 
the evolutionary history of humans for the last four million years, from 
bipedal but small-brained Australo ithecus to modern Homo sapiens, 
our species, through the prolific toormaker Homo habilis and the conti- 
nent-wanderer Homo erectus. The genes of livin humans manifest that 
our ancestors were no fewer than several thousan individuals at any one 
time in the history of these hominid species. 
f 
I shall, then, identify anatomical traits that distinguish us from other 
animals, and oint out our two kinds of heredity, the biological and the 
cultural. Bio I'ogical inheritance is based on the transmission of genetic 
information, in humans very much the same as in other sexually repro- 
ducing organisms. But cultural inheritance is distinctively human, based 
on transmission of information by a teaching and learning process, which 
is, in principle, independent of biological parentage. Cultural inheritance 
makes possible the cumulative transmission of experience from genera- 
tion to generation. Cultural heredity is a swifter and more effective 
(because it can be designed) mode of adaptation to the environment than 
the biological mode. The advent of cultural heredity ushered in cultural 
evolution, which transcends biological evolution. 
In the latter part of this lecture, I explore ethical behavior as a model 
case of a distinctive human trait, and seek to ascertain the causal connec- 
tions between human ethics and human biology. My conclusions are that 
(1) the proclivity to make ethical judgments, i.e., to evaluate actions as 
either good or evil, is rooted in our (biological) nature, a necessary out- 
come of our exalted intelligence; but (2) the moral codes which guide 
our decisions as to which actions are ood and which ones are evil, are 
products of culture, including socia f and religious traditions. This, 
second conclusion contradicts those evolutionists and sociobiologists 
who claim that the morally good is simply that which is promoted by 
the process of biological evolution. 
9 HUMAN ORIGINS 
Mankind is a biological species that has evolved from other species that 
were not human. In order to understand human nature, we must know 
our biological make-up and whence we come, the story of our humbler 
For a century after the publication of Darwin's On the 
Ori beginnin?. i  o Species in 1859, the story of evolution was reconstructed with 
evi c f  ence from paleontology (the study of fossils), biogeogra hy (the 
study of the geogra hical distribution of organisms), and rom the P P comparative study o living organisms: their morphology, development, 
p h y s i o l O ~  an 
d the like. Since mid-twentieth century we have, in addi- 
tion, mo ecular biology, the most informative and precise discipline for 
reconstructing the ancestral relationships of living species. 
Our closest biological relatives are the great a es and, among them, the 
chimpanzees, who are more related to us than t l! ey are to the gorillas, and 
much more than to the orangutans. The hominid lineage diverged from 
the chimpanzee lineage 5-7 million years ago (Mya) and it evolved exclu- 
sively on the African continent until the emergence of Homo erectus, some- 
what before 1.8 Mya. The first known hominid, Ardipithecus rumidus, 
lived 4.4 Mya, but it is not certain that it was bipedal or in the direct line 
of descent to modern humans, Homo supiens. The recently described 
Australopithecw anamensis, dated 3.9-4.2 Mya, was bipedal and has been 
placed in the line of descent to Austral0 ithecus ufarensis, Homo habilis, H. 
erectus, and H sa~iens. Other homini B s, not in the direct line of descent 
to modern humks, are ~wtrulo~ithec& ujicunus, Purunthropus uethiopi- 
cus. l? boisei, and I! robustus. who lived in Africa at various times between 
3 and 1 Mya, a riod when three or four hominid species lived contem- 
~oraneouslv in t R e African continent. 
Shortly 'after its emergence in tropical or subtropical eastern Africa, 
H. erectus spread to other continents. Fossil remains of H. erectus are 
known from Africa, Indonesia (Java), China, the Middle East, and 
Europe. H, erectus fossils from Java have been dated 1.81t0.04 and 
1.66t0.04 Mya, and from Georgia between 1.6 and 1.8 Mya. 
Anatomically distinctive H erectus fossils have been found in Spain, 
deposited before 780,000 years ago, the oldest in southern Europe. 
The transition from H. erectus to H. sa iens occurred around 400,000 
'f years ago, although this date is not well etermined owing to uncertain- 
ty as to whether some fossils are erectus or "archaic" forms of sapiens. 
H. erectus persisted for some time in Asia, until 250,000 years ago in 
China and perhaps until 100,000 ago in Java, and thus was coetaneous 
with early members of its descendant species, H. supiens. Fossil remains 
of Neandertal hominids (Homo neundcrthalensis) appeared in Europe 
around 200,000 years ago and persisted until thirty or forty thousand 
years ago. The Neandertals had, like H. sapiens, large brains. A few years 
ago, they were thou ht to be ancestral to anatomically modern humans, 
but now we know t f at modern humans appeared at least 100,000 years 
ago, much before the disap earance of the Neandertals. Moreover, in 
caves in the Middle East, f ossils of modern humans have been found 
dated 120,000-100,000 years ago, as well as Neandertals dated at 60,000 
and 70,000 years ago, followed again by modern humans dated at 40,000 
years ago. It is unclear whether the two forms repeatedly replaced one 
another by migration from other regions, or whether they coexisted in 
some areas. Recent genetic evidence indicates that interbreeding between 
sapiens and neunderthalensis never occurred. 
There is considerable controversy about the origin of modern humans. 
Some anthropologists argue that the transition from H. erectus to archaic 
H. sapiens and later to anatomically modern humans occurred conso- 
nantly in various parts of the Old World. Proponents of this "multire- 
gional model" emphasize fossil evidence showing regional continuity in 
the transition from H. erectus to archaic and then modern H. sapiens. In 
order to account for the transition from one to another species (some- 
thing which cannot hap en independently in several places), they 
postulate that genetic exc R ange occurred from time to time between 
populations, so that the species evolved as a single gene pool, even thou h 
geographic differentiation occurred and persisted, just as geographic a f  ly 
differentiated populations exist in other animal species, as well as in 
living humans. This explanation depends on the occurrence of persistent 
migrations and interbreeding between populations from different conti- 
nents, of which no direct evidence exists. Moreover, it is dificult to 
reconcile the multiregional model with the contemporary existence of 
different species or forms in different regions, such as the persistence of 
H. erectus in China and Java for more than one hundred thousand years 
after the emergence of sapiens. Other scientists argue instead that 
modern humans first arose in Africa or in the Middle East somewhat 
prior to 100,000 years ago, and from there spread throu hout the world, 1 replacing the preexisting populations of H. erectus or ar aic H. sapiens. 
9 How MANY HUMANS 
Some proponents of this "African replacement" model claim further 
that the transition from archaic to modern H. sapiens was associated with 
a very narrow bottleneck, consisting of only two or very few individuals 
who are the ancestors of all modern mankind. This particular claim of a 
narrow bottleneck is supported, erroneously as I will soon show, by the 
investigation of a peculiar small fraction of our genetic inheritance, the 
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). The African (or Middle East) origin of 
modern humans is, however, supported by a wealth of recent genetic 
evidence and is, therefore, favored by many evolutionists. 
The genetic information we inherit from our parents is encoded in the 
linear sequence of the DNA's four nucleotide components (represented 
by A, C,  G, T)  in the same fashion as semantic information is encoded in 
the sequence of letters of a written text. Most of the DNA is contained 
in the chromosomes inside the cell nucleus. The total amount of DNA 
in a human cell nucleus consists of six thousand million nucleotides, half 
in each set of 23 chromosomes inherited from each parent. A relatively 
small amount of DNA, about 16,000 nucleotides, exists in the mito- 
chondria, cell organelles outside the nucleus. The mtDNA is inherited in 
a peculiar manner, that is, exclusively along the maternal line. The inher- 
itance of the mtDNA is a gender mirror image of the inheritance of the 
family name. Sons and daughters inherit their mtDNA from their 
mother but only the daughters transmit it to their progeny, just as sons 
and daughters receive the family name of the father, but only the sons 
transmit it to their children. 
Analysis of the mtDNA from ethnically diverse individuals has shown 
that the mtDNA sequences of modern humans coalesce to one ancestral 
sequence, the "mitochondrial Eve" that existed in Africa about 200,000 
years ago'. This Eve, however, is not the one mother from whom all 
humans descend, but an mtDNA molecule (or the woman carrier of that 
molecule) from whom all modern mtDNA molecules descend. 
Some science writers have drawn the inference that all humans descend 
from only one, or very few women, but this is based on a confusion 
between gene genealogies and individual genealogies. Gene genealogies 
radually coalesce towards a unique DNA ancestral sequence (in a simi- 
e r  fashion as living species, such as humans, chimpanzees, and orillas, 
coalesce into one ancestral species). Individual genealogies, on t k e con- 
trary, increase by a factor of two in each ancestral generation: an individ- 
ual has two parents, four grandparents, and so on2. Coalescence of a ene 
genealogy into one ancestral gene, originally present in one indivi d ual, 
does not disallow the contemporary existence of many other individuals, 
who are also our ancestors, and from whom we have inherited the other 
genes. 
This conclusion can be illustrated with an analogy. My family name is 
shared by many people, who live in S ain, Mexico, the Philippines, and 
other countries. An historian of our f' amily name has concluded that all 
Ayalas descend from Don Lope Sdnchez de Ayala, randson of Don Vela, 
vassal of King Alfonso VI, who established the c f  omain ("sefiorlo") de 
Ayala in the year 1085, in the now Spanish Basque province of Alava. 
Don Lope is the Adam from whom we all descend on the paternal line, 1 
but we also descend from many other men and women who lived in the I 
eleventh centur%a well as earlier and later. 
The inference warranted by the mt 
mitochondrial Eve is the ancestor of mod 
i line. Any person has a single ancestor in the matwnaI Iinr in any given I 
'I peration. Thus a person inherits the mtDNA from the mother, from 
I the maternal grandmother, from the great grandmother on the maternal 
line, and so on. But the person also inherits other enes from other 
tf I 1 ancestors. The mtDNA that we have inherited from e mitochondria1 - ,1 
Ewe represents one-four-hundred-thousandth of the DNA present in any 75 isi 
modern human (sixteen thousand out of six billion nucleotides). The rest i. 4 
nf the DNA, 400,000 times more than the mtDNA, we have inherited 1 
from other contemporaries of the mitochondria1 Eve. 
From how many contemporaries? The issue of how many huma t 5  ! 
ancestors we had in the past has been elucidated by investigating the 
genes of the human immune system3. The genes of the human leukocyte I 
antigen (HLA) complex exist in multiple versions, which provide peo le R J:' with the diversity necessary to confront bacteria and other pathogens t at 
invade the body. The evolutionary hiitory of some of these genes shows 
chat they coalesce into ancestral genes 30-60 Mya, that is, much before 
the divergence of humans and apes. (Indeed, humans and apes share 
many of these 1 
makes it possible to 
in any one generation in order to account for 
diverse genes throu 
mated effective num 
"effsnive" number 
1' 1 number, but it is a . 1.. 
patible with much larger but not much smaller numbers ofindividuals in 
- >:,;; different generations. Thus, through millions of years our ancestors exis*: ,! ; ,.:;
ed in populations that were 100,000 individuals strong, or larger. ' 
i ' Population bottlenecks may have occurred on  rare occasions. But the 
,', 
enetic evidence indicates that human populations never consisted $ _ .,; 
than several thousand individuals. 2 ,., . t .  4 * :.: - ,:,# , 
t S \ .  ' .  
I 7 .dr FROM BIOLOGY TO CULTURE y- - ". . . 
The most distinctive human anatomical traits are erect posture ant&$'". 
I ,  Lcge brain. We are the only vertebrate species with a bipedal gait and ... . 1' . erect posture; birds are bipedal, but their backbone stands horizontal - 
mher than vertical. Brain size is generally , . 
relative to body mass, humans have the largest 
The chimpanzee's brain weighs less than a pound; a 
more. The human male adult brain is 1400 cubic 
three pounds in weight. 
Evolutionists used to raise the question whether bipedal gait or large 
brain came first, or whether they evolved consonantly. The issue is now 
resolved. Our Awtralopirhecus ancestors had, since four million years ago, I 
a bipedal gait, but a small brain, about 450 cc, a ound in weight. Brain d size starts to increase notably with our Homo ha zlis ancestors, about 2.5 
Mya, who had a brain about 650 cc and also were prolific tool-makers 
(hence the name habilis). Between one and two million years afterwards, 
there lived Homo erectus, with adult brains up to 1200 cc. Our species, 
Homo sapiens, has a brain about three times .as large as that of 
AustraIopithecus, 1300-1400 cc, or some three pounds of gray matter. Our 
brain is not only much larger than that of chimpanzees or gorillas, but 
also much more complex. The cerebral cortex, where the higher co ni- 
che rest of the brain when compared to apes. 
g, tive functions are processed, is in humans disproportionally greater t an 
Erect posture and lar e brain are not the only anatomical traits that 
distinguish us from non a uman primates, even if they may be the most 
obvious. A list of our most distinctive anatomical features includes the 
following (of which the last five items are not detectable in fossils): 
Erect posture and bipedal gait (entail changes of the backbone, 
hipbone, and feet) 
Opposing thumbs and arm and hand changes (make possible precise 
manipulation) 
Lar e brain 
Re j uction of jaws and remodeling of face 
Changes in skin and skin glands 
Reduction in body hair 
Cryptic ovulation (and extended female sexual receptivity) 
Slow development 
Modification of vocal tract and larynx 
Reorganization of the brain 
Humans are notably different from other animals not only in anatomy, 
but also and no less importantly in their behavior, both individually and 
socially. A list of distinctive human behavioral traits includes the following: 
Subtle expression of emotions 
Intelligence: abstract thinking, categorizing, and reasoning 
Symbolic (creative) language 
Self-awareness and death-awareness 
Tool-making and technology 
Science, literature, and art 
Ethics and religion 
Social or anization and cooperation (division of labor) 
Legal c&s and political institutions 
Humans live in groups that are socially organized, and so do other 
primates. But primate societies do not approach the complexity of 
I human social organization. A distinctive human social trait is culture, which may be understood as the set of non-strictly biological human activities and creations. Culture includes social and political institutions, ways of doing things, religious and ethical traditions, language, common sense and scientific knowledge, art and literature, technology, and in general all the creations of the human mind. The advent of culture has brought with it cultural evolution, a superorganic mode of evolution superimposed on the organic mode, and which has in the last few millennia become the dominant mode of human evolution. Cultural 
evolution has come about because of cultural change and inheritance, a 
distinctively human mode of achieving adaptations to the environment 
and transmitting the adaptations through the generations. 
Humans have two kinds of heredity-biological and cultural, which 
may also be called organic and superorganic, or endosomatic and exoso- 
matic systems of heredity. Biological inheritance in humans is very much 
like that in any other sexually reproducin organism; it is based on the 
transmission of genetic information enco f ed in DNA from one genera- 
tion to the next by means of the sex cells. Cultural inheritance, on the 
other hand, is based on transmission of information by a teaching-learn- 
ing process, which is in principle independent of biological parentage. 
Culture is transmitted by instruction and learning, by example and 
imitation, through books, newspapers and radio, television and motion 
pictures, through works of art, and by any other means of communica- 
tion. Culture is acquired by every person from parents, relatives and 
neighbors, and from the whole human environment. 
Cultural inheritance makes possible for humans what no other organ- 
ism can accomplish-the cumulative transmission of experience from 
generation to generation. Animals can learn from experience, but they do 
not transmit their experiences, their "discoveries," to the following 
I generations (at least not to any large extent). Animals have individual memory, but they do not have a "social memory." Humans, on the other hand, have developed a culture because they can transmit cumulatively their experiences from generation to generation. Cultural inheritance makes possible cultural evolution, that is, the evolution of knowledge, social structures, ethics, and all other compo- nents that make up human culture. Cultural inheritance makes possible a new mode of adaptation to the environment that is not available to nonhuman organisms-adaptation by means of culture. Organisms in general adapt to the environment by means of natural selection, by changing their genetic constitution over generations to suit the demands of the environment. But humans, and humans alone, can also adapt by 
changing the environment to suit the needs of their genes. (Animals 
build nests and modify their environment also in other ways, but the 
I manipulation of the environment by any nonhuman species is trivial compared to that by humans.) For the last few millennia humans have 7 
been adapting the environment to their genes more often than their genes 
to the environment. 
In order to extend its geographical habitat, or to survive in a changing 
environment, a population of organisms must become adapted, through 
slow accumulation of genetic variants sorted out by natural selection, to 
the new climatic conditions, different sources of food, different com eti- 
tors, and so on. The discovery of fire and the use of shelter and clot 1 ing 
allowed humans to spread from the warm tropical and subtropical regions 
of the Old World to the whole earth, except for the frozen wastes of 
Antarctica, without the anatomical development of fur or hair. Humans 
did not wait for genetic mutants promoting wing development; they have 
conquered the air in a somewhat more efficient and versatile way by 
building flying machines. People travel the rivers and the seas without 
gills or fins. The exploration of outer space has started without waiting 
for mutations providing humans with the ability to breathe with low oxy- 
gen pressures or to function in the absence of gravity; astronauts carry 
their own oxygen and specially equipped pressure suits. From their 
obscure beginnings in Africa, humans have become the most widespread 
and abundant species of mammal on earth. It was the appearance of 
culture as a superorganic form of adaptation that made humans the most 
successful animal species. 
Cultural adaptation has prevailed in mankind over biological adapta- 
tion because it is a more rapid mode of adaptation and because it can be 
directed. A favorable genetic mutation newly arisen in an individual can 
be transmitted to a sizeable part of the human species only through innu- 
merable generations. However, a new scientific discovery or technical 
achievement can be transmitted to all humans, potentially at least, in less 
than one generation. Moreover, whenever a need arises, culture can 
directly pursue the appropriate changes to meet the challenge. On the 
contrary, biological adaptation depends on the accidental availability of a 
favorable mutation, or of a combination of several mutations, at the time 
and place where the need arises. 
Erect osture and large brain are distinctive anatomical features of 
modern R umans. High intelligence, symbolic languaf, religion, and 
ethics are some of the behavioral traits that distinguis us from other 
animals. The account of human origins that I have sketched implies a 
continuity in the evolutionary process that goes from our nonhuman 
ancestors of eight million years ago through primitive hominids to mod- 
ern humans. A icientific explanatio of that evolutionary sequence must 
account for th mergence of hum anatomical and behavioral traits in 
terms of natural selection together with other distinctive biological caus- 
es and processes. One explanatory strategy is to focus on a particular 
human feature and seek to identify the conditions under which this fea- 
ture may have been favored by natural selection. Such a strategy may lead 
to erroneous conclusions as a consequence of the fallacy of selective atten- 
tion: some traits may have come about not because they are themselves 
adaptive, but rather because they are associated with traits that are favored 
by natural selection. 
Geneticists have long recognized the phenomenon of "pleiotropy," the 
expression of a gene in different organs or anatomical traits. It follows 
that a gene that becomes changed owing to its effects on a certain trait 
will result in the modification of other traits as well. The changes of these 
other traits are epigenetic consequences of the changes directly promoted 
by natural selection. The cascade of consequences may be, particularly in 
the case of humans, very long and far from obvious in some cases. 
Literature, art, science, and technology are among the behavioral features 
that may have come about not because they were adaptively favored in 
human evolution, but because they are expressions of the high intellectu- 
al abilities present in modern humans: what may have been favored by 
natural selection (its "target") was an increase in intellectual ability rather 
than of those particular activities as such. 
O WHENCE THICS AND VALUES? 
I I now will briefly explore ethics and ethical behavior as a model case of 
how we may seek the evolutionary explanation of a distinctively human 
trait. I select ethical behavior because morality is a human trait that seems 
remote from biological rocesses. My goal is to ascertain whether an 
account can be advance 1 of ethical behavior as an outcome of biological 
evolution and, if such is the case, whether ethical behavior was directly 
promoted by natural selection, or has rather come about as an epigenetic 
manifestation of some other trait that was the tar et of natural selection. 
I will argue that ethical behavior (the proc f ivity to judge human 
actions as either good or evil) has evolved as a consequence of natural 
selection, not because it was adaptive in itself, but rather as a pleiotropic 
consequence of the high intelligence characteristic of humans. However, 
I will first point out that the question whether ethical behavior is biolog- 
ically determined may refer either to (1) the capacity for ethics (i.e., the 
proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong) and which I 
will refer to as "ethical behavior," or (2) the moral norms or moral codes 
accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. My theses are that: 
(1) the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature, and 
thus a product of biological evolution; but (2) moral norms are products 
of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. 
My first thesis is grounded on the argument that humans exhibit eth- 
ical behavior because their biological makeup determines the presence of 
the three necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions for ethical behavior: 
the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions, the abili- 
ty to make value judgments, and the ability to choose between alternative 
courses of action. I thus maintain that ethical behavior came about in 
evolution not because it is adaptive in itself, but as a necessary conse- 
uence of humanity's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute 
Iirectly promoted by natural selection. 
My second thesis contradicts the proposal of many distinguished 
evolutionists who, since Darwin's time, have argued that the norms of 
morality are derived from biological evolution. It also contradicts the 
sociobiologists who have recently developed a subtle version of that 
proposal. The sociobiologists' argument is that human ethical norms are 
sociocultural correlates of behaviors fostered by biological evolution. 
I argue that such proposals are misguided and do not escape the natural- 
istic fallacy. It is true that both natural selection and moral norms some- 
times coincide on the same behavior; i.e., the two are consistent. But this 
isomorphism between the behaviors promoted by natural selection and 
those sanctioned by moral norms exists only with respect to the conse- 
uences of the behaviors; the underlying causations are completely 
]ispar ate. 
I shall now develop these ideas. 
*:* ETHICAL JUDGMENTS VERSUS ETHICAL NORMS 
I have noted that the question of whether ethical behavior is 
biologically determined may refer to either one of the following issues: 
(1) Is the capacity for ethics-the roclivity to judge human actions as 
either right or wrongdetermine! by the biological nature of human 
beings? (2) Are the systems or codes of ethical norms accepted by human 
beings biologically determined? A similar distinction can be made with 
respect to Ian uage. The issue whether the ca acity for symbolic language d f f  is determine by our biological nature is di erent from the question of 
whether the particular language we speak (English, Spanish, or Japanese) 
is biologically necessary. 
The first uestion posed is more fundamental; it asks whether or not 
the biologics 'I nature of Homo sapiens is such that humans are necessarily 
inclined to make moral judgments and to accept ethical values, to identi- 
fy certain actions as either right or wrong. Affirmative answers to this 
first question do not necessarily determine what the answer to the second 
question should be. Independently of whether or not humans are neces- ' 
sarily ethical, it remains to be determined whether particular moral 
prescriptions are in fact determined by our biological nature, or whether 1 i they are chosen by society, or by individuals. Even if we were to condude , 
that people cannot avoid having moral standards of conduct, it might be 
that the choice of the particular standards used for judgment would be 
arbitrary, or that it depended on some other, nonbiological criteria. The 
need for havin moral values does not necessarily tell us what these moral 
values should % e, just as the capacity for language does not determine 
which language we will speak. 
The thesis I propose is that humans are ethical beings by their 
biological nature. Humans evaluate their behavior as either right or 
wrong, moral or immoral, as a consequence of their eminent intellectual 
capacities which include self-awareness and abstract thinking. These 
intellectual ca acities are products of the evolutionary process, but they 
are distinctive P y human. Thus, I maintain that ethical behavior is not 
causally related to the social behavior of animals, including sin and 
reciprocal "altruism." 
A second thesis that I put forward is that the moral norms according to 
which we evaluate particular actions as morally either good or bad (as well 
as the grounds that may be used to justify the moral norms) are products 
of cultural evolution, not of biological evolution. The norms of morality 
belong, in this respect, to the same category of phenomena as the 
languages spoken by different peoples, their political and reli ious institu- 
tions, and the arts, sciences, and technology. The moral co d es, like these 
other products of human culture, are often consistent with the biological 
predispositions of the human species, dispositions we may to some extent 
share with other animals. But this consistency between ethical norms and 
biological tendencies is not necessary or univer : it does not apply to all 
ethical norms in a given society, much less in + uman societies. 
Moral codes, like any other dimensions of c 3 turd systems, depend on 
the existence of human biological nature and must be consistent with it 
in the sense that they could not counteract it without promoting their 
own demise. Moreover, the acceptance and persistence of moral norms is 
facilitated whenever they are consistent with biologically conditioned 
human behaviors. But the moral norms are independent of such behav- 
iors in the sense that some norms may not favor, and may hinder, the 
survival and reproduction of the individual and its genes, which are the 
targets of biological evolution. Discrepancies between accepted moral 
rules and biological survival are, however, necessarily limited in scope or 
would otherwise lead to the extinction of the groups accepting such 
discrepant rules: 
$ THE CAPACITY FOR MORAL REASONING 
I argue that the question whether ethical behavior is determined by our 
biological nature must be answered in the affirmative. By "ethical behav- 
ior" I mean here to refer to the urge toward judging human actions as 
either good or bad, which is not the same as "good behavior" (i.e., doing 
what is perceived as good instead of what is perceived as evil). Humans 
exhibit ethical behavior by nature because their biological constitution 
determines the presence in them of the three necessary, and jointly suffi- 
cient, conditions for ethical behavior. These conditions are: (a) the abil- 
ity to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (b) the ability to 
make value judgments; and (c) the ability to choose between alternative 
courses of action. I shall briefly examine each of these abilities and show 
that they exist as a consequence of the eminent intellectual capacity of 
human beings. 
The ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions is the 
most fundamental of the three conditions required for ethical behavior. 
Only if I can anticipate that pulling the trigger will shoot the bullet, 
which in turn will strike and kill my enemy, can the action of pulling the 
trigger be evaluated as nefarious. Pulling a trigger is not in itself a moral 
I action; it becomes so by virtue of its relevant consequences. My action 
has an ethical dimension only if I do anticipate these consequences. 
I The ability to anticipate the consequences of one's actions is closely 
related to the ability to establish the connection between means and ends; 
I that is, of seeing a mean precisely as mean, as somethin that serves a 
articular end or purpose. This ability to establish t f e connection 
petween means and their ends requires the ability to anticipate the future 
and to form mental ima es of realities not present or not yet in existence. B The ability to estab ~ s h  the connection between means and ends 
happens to be the fundamental intellectual capacity that has made possi- 
ble the development of human culture and technology. The evolutionary 
roots of this capacity may be found in the evolution of bipedal gait, which 1 transformed the anterior limbs of our ancestors from organs of locomo- 
I tion into organs of manipulation. The hands thereby gradually became 
or ans adept for the construction and use of objects for hunting and 
ot f er activities that improved survival and reproduction, that is, that 
increased the reproductive fitness of their carriers. 
The construction of tools, however, depends not only on manual 
dexterity, but in perceiving them precisely as tools, as objects that help to 
perform certain actions, that is, as means that serve certain ends or 
purposes: a knife for cutting, an arrow for hunting, an animal skin for 
protecting the body from the cold. The hypothesis I am propounding is 
that natural selection promoted the intellectual capacity of our biped 
ancestors, because increased intelligence facilitated the perception of tools 
as tools, and therefore their construction and use, with the ensuing 
amelioration of biological survival and reproduction. 
The development of the intellectual abilities of our ancestors took 
place over two million years or longer, gradually increasing the ability to 
connect means with their ends and, hence, the possibility of making ever 
more complex tools servin remote purposes. The ability to anticipate f the future, essential for et ical behavior, is therefore closely associated 
with the development of the ability to construct tools, an ability that has 
produced the advanced technologies of modern societies and that is large- 
ly responsible for the success of mankind as a biological species. 
The second condition for the existence of ethical behavior is the abili- 
ty to make value judgments, to perceive certain objects or deeds as more 
I desirable than others. Only if I can see the death of my enemy as prefer- 
able to his or her survival (or vice versa) can the action leading to his or 
1 her demise be thought of as moral. If the alternative conse uences of an 
action are neutral with respect to value, the action cannot 1 e character- 
ized as ethical. The ability to make value judgments depends on the 
capacity for abstraction, that is, on the capacity to perceive actions or 
objects as members of general classes. This makes it possible to compare 
ob'ects or actions with one another and to perceive some as more desir- 
ab I e than others. The capacity for abstraction, necessary to perceiving 
individual objects or actions as members of general classes, requires an 
advanced intelligence such as exists in humans and apparently in them 
alone. Thus, I see the ability to make value judgments primarily as an 
implicit consequence of the enhanced intelligence favored by natural 
selection in human evolution. Nevertheless, valuing certain objects or 
actions and choosing them over their alternatives can be of biological 
consequence; doing this in terms of general categories can be beneficial in 
practice. 
Moral judgments are a particular class of value judgments; namely 
those where preference is not dictated by one's own interest or profit, but 
by regard for others, which may cause benefits to particular individuals 
(altruism), or take into consideration the interests of a social group to 
which one belongs. Value judgments indicate preference for what is 
perceived as good and rejection of what is perceived as bad; good and bad 
may refer to monetary, aesthetic, or all sorts of other kinds of values. 
Moral judgments concern the values of right and wrong in human 
conduct. 
The third condition necessary for ethical behavior is the ability to 
choose between alternative courses of action. Pulling the trigger can be a 
moral action only if I have the option not to pull it. A necessary action 
beyond our control is not a moral action: the circulation of the blood or 
the digestion of food are not moral actions. 
Whether there is free will has been much discussed by philosophers, 
and this is not the appropriate place to review the arguments. I will only 
advance two considerations based on our common-sense experience. 
One is our profound personal conviction that the possibility of choosing 
between alternatives is enuine rather than only apparent4. The second 
consideration is that w 1 en we confront a given situation that requires 
action on our part, we are able mentally to explore alternative courses of 
action, thereby extending the field within which we can exercise our free 
will. In any case, if there were no free will, there would be no ethical 
behavior; morality would only be an illusion. The point that I wish to 
make here is, however, that free will is dependent on the existence of a 
well-developed intelligence, which makes it ossible to explore alternative 
courses of action and to choose one or anot er in view of the anticipated 
consequences. 
R 
In summary, my proposal is that ethical behavior is an attribute of the 
biological make-up of humans and is, in that sense, a product of biological 
evolution. But I see no evidence that ethical behavior developed because it 
was adaptive in itselE I find it hard to see how maiuuting certain actions as 
either good or evil (as opposed to just choosing some actions rather than 
others, or evaluating them with respect to their practical consequences) 
would promote the reproductive fitness of the evaluators. Nor do I see how 
there might be some form of "incipient" ethical behavior that would then 
be further promoted by natural selection. The three necessary conditions for 
there being ethical behavior are manifestations of advanced intellectual 
abilities. 
It rather seems that the likely target of natural selection may have been 
the develo ment of these advanced intellectual capacities. This develop- 
ment was P avored by natural selection because the construction and use of 
tools improved the strategic position of our bi ed ancestors. Once 
bipedalism evolved and tool-using and tool-ma 'n became possible, 
those individuals more effective in these functions 5 ha a greater probabil- 
ity of biological success. The biological advantage provided by the design 
and use of tools persisted long enough so that intellectual abilities 
continued to increase, eventually yielding the eminent development of 
intelligence that is characteristic of Homo sapienz. 
I 
I 
.t. THE CONTENT OF MORAL NORMS 
There are many theories concerned with the rational grounds for 
morality, such as deductive theories that seek to discover the axioms or 
I fundamental principles that determine what is morally correct on the 
basis of direct moral intuition. There also are theories, like logical 
positivism or existentialism, which negate rational foundations for moral- 
ity, reducing moral princi les to emotional decisions or to other irrational 
I! grounds. Since the pu lication of Darwin's theory of evolution by 
natural selection, philosophers as well as biologists have attempted to find 
in the evolutionary process the justification for moral norms. The com- 
mon ground to all such proposals is that evolution is a natural process 
that achieves goals that are desirable and thereby morally good; indeed it 
has produced humans. Proponents of these ideas claim that only the 
evolutionary goals can give moral value to human action: whether a 
I human deed is morally right depends on whether it directly or indirectly 
promotes the evolutionary process and its natural objectives. 
Herbert Spencer5 was perhaps the first philosopher seeking to find the 
grounds of morality in biological evolution. More recent attempts 
I include those of the distinguished evolutionists J.S. Hwley" and C.H. Waddington7, and of Edward 0. Wilsona, Y, founder of sociobiology as an 
1 independent discipline engaged in discovering the biological foundations 
I of social behavior. I have argued elsewhere'" that the moral theories 
I 
1 proposed by Spencer, Huxley, and Waddington are mistaken and fail to 
I avoid the naturalistic fallacy". These authors argue, in one or another 
I fashion, that the standard by which human actions are judged good or 
I evil derives from the contribution the actions make to evolutionary 
progress. A blunder of this argumentation is that it is based on value 
jud ments about what is or is not progressive in (particularly human) 
evo f utionI2. There is nothing objective in the evolutionary process itself 
that makes the success of bacteria, which have persisted for more than 
three billion years and in enormous diversity and numbers, less "progres- 
sive" than that of the vertebrates, even though the latter are more 
~ornplex'~. Nor are the insects, of which more than one million species 
exist, less successful or less progressive from a purely biological perspec- 
tive than humans or any other mammal species. Moreover, the ropo- 
nents of evolution-grounded moral codes fail to demonstrate w 1 y the 
promotion of biological evolution by itself should be the standard to 
measure what is morally good. 
The most recent and most subtle attempt to ground the moral codes 
on the evolutionary process emanates from the sociobiologists, particu- 
larly from E.O. Wilsona, ', who starts by proposing that "scientists and 
I humanists should consider together the possibility that the time has come 
for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers 
and bi~logicized."'~ The sociobiologists argue that our perception that 
morality exists is an epigenetic manifestation of our genes, which s d  
mani ulate humans as to make them believe that some behaviors a k  P mora ly "good" so that people behave in ways that are good for their 
enes. Humans might not otherwise pursue these behaviors (altruism, 
for example) because their genetic benefit is not apparent (except to 
sociobiologists after the development of their discipline)l5. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the sociobiologists' account of the 
evolution of the moral sense is misguidedlo, As I have shown above, 
we make moral judgments as a consequence of our eminent intellectual 
abilities, not as an innate way for achieving biological gain. Moreover, the 
sociobiologists' position may be inter reted as calling for the supposition 
that those norms of morality should g e considered supreme that achieve 
the most biological (genetic) ain (because that is, in their view, why the L moral sense evolved at all). T is, in turn, would justify social preferences, 
including racism and even genocide, that many of us (sociobiologists 
included) judge morally obtuse and even heinous. 
The evaluation of moral codes or human actions must take into 
account biological knowledge, but biology is insuficient for determining [ which moral codes are, or should be, accepted. This may be reiterated by returning to the analogy with human languages. Our biological nature 
determines the sounds that we can or cannot utter and also constrains 
human language in other ways. But a language's syntax and vocabulary 
are not determined by our biological nature (otherwise, there could not 
be a multitude of tongues), but are products of human culture. Likewise, 
moral norms are not determined by biological processes, but by cultural 
traditions and principles that are products of human history. 
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS: CIENCE AND ITS LIMITS 
Science is a wondrously successful way of knowing. Science seeks 
explanations of the natural world by formulating hypotheses that are 
subject to the possibility of empirical falsification or corroboration. A 
scientific hypothesis is tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions 
about the world of experience derived as logical consequences from the 
hypothesis agree with what is actually observed". Science is a mode of 
inquiry into the nature of the universe that has been successful and of 
great consequence. Witness the proliferation of science academic depart- 
ments in universities and other research institutions, the enormous 
budgets that the body politic and the private sector willin ly commit to 
scientific research, and its economic impact. The OfFice o k Management 
and the Budget (OMB) of the U.S. government has estimated that fifty 
percent of all economic growth in the United States since the Second 
World War can directly be attributed to scientific knowledge and techno- 
logical advances. The technology derived from scientific knowledge 
pervades our lives: the high-rise buildings of our cities, thruways and long 
span-bridges, rockets that take us to the moon, telephones that provide 
instant communication across continents, computers that perform 
complex calculations in millionths of a second, vaccines and drugs that 
keep bacterial parasites at bay, gene therapies that replace DNA in defec- 
tive cells. All these remarkable achievements bear witness to the validity 
of the scientific knowledge from which they originated. 
Scientific knowledge is also remarkable in the way it emerges by wa r of consensus and agreement among scientists, and in the way new know -
edge builds upon past accomplishment rather than startin anew with B each generation or each new ractitioner. Surely scientists Isagree with 
each other on many matters; !ut these are issues not yet settled, and the 
oints of disagreement generally do not bring into question previous 
Lowledge. Modern scientists do not challenge that atoms exist, or that 
there is a universe with a myriad stars, or that heredity is encased in the 
DNA. 
Science is a way of knowing, but it is not the only way. Knowledge 
also derives from other sources, such as common sense, artistic and 
religious experience, and philosophical reflection. The validity of the 
knowledge acquired by non-scientific modes of inquiry can be simply 
established by pointing out that science dawned in the sixteenth century, 
but mankind had for centuries built cities and roads, brought forth olit- P ical institutions and sophisticated codes of law, advanced pro ound 
philosophies and value systems, and created magnificent plastic art, as 
well as music and literature. We thus learn about ourselves and about the 
world in which we live and we also benefit from products of this non-sci- 
entific knowledge. The crops we harvest and the animals we husband 
emerged millennia before the dawn of science from practices set down by 
farmers in the Middle East, Andean Sierras, and Mayan plateaus. 
It is not my intention in this essay's final section to belabor the extra- 
ordinary fruits of nonscientific modes of inquiry. I wish simply to state 
something that is obvious, but becomes at times clouded by hubris, an 
infirmit of mores that all too often aflicts members of my profession. 
Success l' ul as it is, and universally encompassing as its subject is, a scien- 
tific view of the world is hopelessly incomplete. There are matters of 
value and meaning that are outside the sco e of science. Even when we 
achieve scientific understanding of a natura f object or process, we are still 
) missing matters that may well be thought by many to be of equal or 
I greater import. Scientific knowledge may enrich aesthetic and moral erce tions, and may illuminate the significance of life and the world, 
put tRese are matters outside the realm of science. 
On  April 28, 1937, early in the Spanish Civil War, Nazi airplanes 
bombed the small B ue town of Guernica, the first time that a civilian 
population had been 1 eterminedly destroyed from the air. The Spanish 
painter Pablo Picasso had recently been commissioned by the Spanish 
Republican Government to paint a large composition for the Spanish 
pavilion at the Paris World Exhibition of 1937. In a frenz of manic 
energy, the enraged Picasso sketched in two days and fully out I' ined in ten 
more days his famous Gucmica, an immense painting of 25 feet, 8 inch- 
es by 11 feet, 6 inches. Suppose that I now would describe the images 
represented in the their size and position, as well as the 
pigments used and t of the canvas. This description would be 
of interest, but it be satis6ing if I had completely omitted 
aesthetic analysis and considerations of meaning, the dramatic message of 
the inhumanity conveyed by the outstretched figure of the mother 
pulling her slaughtered baby, the bellowing faces, the wounded horse or 
the satanic image of the bull. 
Let Gucrnica be a metaphor of the point I wish to make. Scientific 
knowledge, like the description of size, materials, and geometry of 
Guernica, is satisfying and useful. But once science has had its say, there 
remains unsettled much about reality that is of interest, questions of value 
and meaning that are forever beyond the scope of science. In order to 
understand ourselves and our place in the economy of things, we need 
much more than scientific knowledge. We need psychology and sociolo- 
' gy, as well as history, aesthetics and philosophy; if we seek religious under- 
standing, we'll profit from theology. 
My purpose in this essay has been to provide what I see as a necessary 
dimension, the biological one, of any view of human nature that seeks to 
be relevant and complete. But I do not pretend that biology provides 
now, or ever will provide, a complete understanding of what we humans 
are and our place in the universei0. 
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/ 3 Ever since its first publication by Charles Darwin in 1859, the doctrine 
of evolution of livin forms and species by natural selection among indi- 
vidual variations wit E in a given population in a struggle for survival, has 
been a matter of dispute among scientists and of ideological controversy. 
The dispute among scientists, however, did not center on the issue of 
whether there is or can be a process of evolution of higher organized species 
from lower forms of life. Rather, the scientific discussions were mainly 
concerned with the question of whether the principle of natural selection 
is sufficient to ex lain the process of the emergence of ever new and more 
complex forms o P life. There are a number of difficult questions related to 
this issue. First of all, what is the standard requirement according to which 
selection operates? Is adaptation to external conditions the standard of 
fitness for natural selection, as the mechanistic interpretation of Darwinism 
I in the late 19th century assumed, or does the spontaneous productivity of 
' genetic variation lead to the discovery of new natural "niches" for survival 
and consequently of new objects for adaptation? Furthermore, can a 
continuous and cumulative occurrence of small variants under the pres- 
sures of natural selection issue in the emergence of a new species, or do 
small changes tend to disappear because they don't fit in the overall system 
of the organism and of its functioning? Would, then, a "fulguration"[a 
lightning flash] of a complete new scheme of organization be required for 
a new species to emerge? Finally, how is the 
evolutionar process towards ever more complex 
accounted l' or? These are but a few of the more 
plagued Darwinism from the start and still continue to vex its defenders. 
Nevertheless, the general erspective of the Darwinian theory has been 
victorious, though it is stil I' hypothetical and the evidence for it rests on a 
somewhat defective fossil record rather than on experiential demonstration, 
since new species are not easy to create by experiment. For all its difficul- 1 ties, the theory of evolution still provides the most plausible interpretation 
1 of what is known about the history of organic life on this planet. 
Resistance to this new theory from the side of the churches had been 
predictable, since it stood in clear contrast, if not contradiction to the 
traditional concept of creation. For many centuries it had been taken for 
granted that, according to the Biblical account in the first chapter of 
Genesis, the species of plants and animals had been created by God on the 
fifth and the sixth day of creation and remained unchanged ever since. It 
is the position that so-called "creationists" defend to the present day. Even 
among those who did not cling to Biblical literalism, however, it seemed 
unacceptable that the theory of evolution re laced God's purposive action P in bringing about the different forms of li e by a mechanical process of 
nature. In this controversy, the point is that before Darwin the purposive 
action of the creator had been understood to provide the only explanation 
for the fact of different s ecies of animal life. Therefore, the proposal of a R natural explanation for t e same result was taken as a denial of God's pur- 
posive action in the creation of living forms. In principle, of course, the 
assum tion of God's purposive action need not have excluded the use of 
natur i causes in the execution of the Divine pur ose. In hct, however, 
after Darwin's book On the Origin of Species had g een published, Divine 
purpose and the mechanical operation of natural causes were taken as 
mutually exclusive. 
Given the antagonistic climate of the early discussions on Darwin's 
theory, it is astonishing that from the beginning some leading British 
churchmen and theologians tried to reinterpret Christian doctrine in light 
of the perspective of evolution. The most remarkable of these attempts was 
a book edited by Charles Gore in 1889 under the title Lux Muncti: A Series 
of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation. As the title suggests, the book 
reinterpreted the Incarnation of the Divine Logos in Jesus Christ in terms 
of providin the culmination of the evolution of life. While the process of 
natural evo f ution culminates in the emer ence of the human race, so the 
history of the human race reached its cf imax in the incarnation. To a 
certain extent, such a theological scheme was su ested by early Church 
Fathers like Irenaeus. But now the picture of a s 
d ty leadin toward the event of the incarnation by inclu lng the process of natural evolution of life as prehistory of that 
salvific history. Interestingly, the authors contributin to L w  Mundi did k not take the Darwinian evolution to describe a mec a n i d  process, but 
rather a historical process. That was hardly warranted by the evolutionary 
theory prevalent around 1890. Lux M u d i  rather pointed beyond that 
theory to a future concept of "emergent" or "organic ' evolution, as it was 
pro osed in 1923 by Lloyd Morgan. "Emergence" means that in each step 
o f t  R e evolutionary process something new comes into existence. It does 
not merely " result' b mechanic necessity from past conditions. This 
concept of "emergenty' evolution vindicated the ositive evaluation of 
Darwinism by the group of Lux Mundi, who had ce I'ebrated the new theo- 
ry for doing away with the God of deism who had been responsible for the 
beginnin s only, while now God could be seen to be active in every new 
turn of t \ e evolutionary process. The concept of "emergentn evolution 
overcame the mechanistic, reductionistic way of describing Darwin's theo- 
ry. And the tendency to emphasize the element of the new in the sequence 
of evolving forms of life was further stren thened by the realization that 
major steps in the evolutionary process nee!"hlgurations" of new schemes 
of organization rather than a sequence of small steps of cumulative varia- 
tions. 
9 After providing the stage for a theological discussion of evolution, I now 
turn to the crucial issue of whether a theological appropriation of the 
doctrine of evolution can do justice to the Genesis account of the creation 
of animal species by God. In the third section of this paper the same ques- 
tion will be asked with regard to the human race. What has been said so far 
on the further development and refinement of the theory of evolution since 
Darwin, will prove helphl in the attempt to answer both these questions. 
When we turn to the Biblical account of creation, the first thing must 
be to remind ourselves that the Biblical texts are historical documents and 
have to be interpreted in terms of what the were trying to say at the time 
of their composition. This principle of ZI istorical interpretation of the 
Bible is the core issue in all discussions with creationists. Historical inter- 
pretation reads the Biblical &~rmations relative to the time of their 
writing, to the concerns of their authors at the time of their writing, and to 
the knowledge they had at their disposal. Such historical inter retation 
does not imply that the Biblical affirmations, being limited to t R eir own 
time, had nothing to tell readers of a much later period. Rather, whatever 
they have to tell us, they convey precisely in their historical particularity. 
To the degree that their affirmations have universal significance, it is inher- 
ent in their historical particularity. Otherwise this significance would not 
be the meanin of the Biblical affirmations, but a meaning the modern 
interpreter rea f s into them. Furthermore, the historical reading of the 
Biblical &lrmations does not preclude their appreciation as the Word of 
God; the Word that is addressing us like every generation of humanity. 
The Word of God expressed in the Biblical affirmations is, however, a 
unified entity. It is the Word of God that became incarnate in Jesus Christ. 
To read or hear the Bible as the Word of God is to relate each particular 
Biblical affirmation to the whole of the Biblical witness and to interpret the 
detailed, historical1 distinctive affirmations in that light. Therefore, 
reverence for the Bi r, le as the Word of God does not stand in opposition to 
a careful historical scrutiny of each individual sentence. 
With regard to the Biblical report on the creation of the world in the 
first chapter of Genesis, this means that we have to read its affirmations as 
witnessing to the God of Israel, the Creator of the world, through the use 
of the natural science of the sixth century BCE (i.e. Babylonian wisdom), 
in order to account for the sequence of creatures coming forth from God's 
creative activity. The relevance of this report in our present situation, then, 
is primarily the encouragement to use the science of our da in a similar 
way - for the purpose of witnessing today to the God o f?' the Bible as 
Creator of the universe, as we know it. This is the authority of the Biblical 
report on the creation of the world. It calls us to attempt our own theolo- 
gy of nature, but in doing so to remain true to the peculiar and distinctive 
nature of the God of Israel, just as the authors of the priestly report on the 
creation of the World did in their own time. 
The authority of the Biblical report does not require us to consider 
every detail as the last word on any given issue. Many statements are 
inevitably indebted to the limited knowledge of nature in the Gth century 
BCE. One example is the idea that the experience of rain is evidence of a 
huge su ply of water in heaven above the clouds, comparable to the 
oceans l own below. On this assumption, it is astonishin that the waters 
above the clouds normally remain se arated from those eneath. This is R % explained by the idea (Gen. I:GC.) t at God created a vault to keep the 
waters above from pourin down. This mechanism is completely rational, 
and yet this beautiful an f important detail can no longer be part of our 
conception of nature. The same applies to the assumption that all the 
different ty es of creatures, and especially all the different species of plants 
and anima I' s were created in the beginning and remain permanently 
unchan ed. This idea is an example of the mythical attitude of mind in 
early cu k tures, where generally, as Mircea Eliade told us, the world order 
was conceived as having been built in the "original time" without later 
change. By contrast, modern knowledge of nature possesses sufficient 
evidence for assuming that the natural world is in a continuous process of 
becoming. The continuous emergence of new types of creatures and the 
disappearance of others is part of that picture. 
Does the modern conception of nature in terms of continuous change 
contradict the Biblical doctrine of creation? It is certainly at variance with 
the account, in the first chapter of Genesis, that the whole order of creation 
was produced in six days and continues to exist unchanged. Thus God laid 
down the order of heaven and earth and this became the model for the 
order of time, which repeats the first seven days every week. But with the 
Bible as a whole this is not the only conception of God's creative activity. 
Rather, in the rophetic writings we learn that God is continuously active 
in the course o P history, and that once in awhile He creates something uite 
new (Is. 48:Gf.). That is not to deny the creation of heaven and eart 1 in 
the beginning. But second Isaiah takes that as an example of God's 
continuously creative activity. This, then, is the model of a continuous 
creation which is coextensive with the course of the world's history, and 
within which the creation of heaven and earth in the beginning was only 
the initial stage. This rophetic conception of God's creative activity is 
much closer to the mo 1 ern understanding of nature in terms of a histo 
of the universe than is the image of the six-day-creation in Genesis. Suc 7 
a conception of continuous creation does not have difficulties with a 
doctrine of evolution, according to which the different species of animals 
emerge successively in the long process of life's history on earth. 
There is one requirement, however, that must be met if the concept of 
evolution is to be compatible with a the010 of nature based on the P Biblical idea of God. That is the assumption o something new that occurs 
in each and every single event, but also in the emergence of new forms of 
life in the process of evolution. This element of contingency was not in the 
focus of the early mechanistic interpretation of Darwinism, but it has been 
increasingly emphasized in the conception of epigenesis, which means the 
emergence of something new, and in the concept of emergent evolution. 
Why is the element of contingency so important in a the010 ical appro- P priation of the theory of evolution? The reason is that the Bib e conceives 
of God's relationship to the world in terms of free, creative acts, in the 
course of history as well as with reference to the beginning of this world. 
In the first chapter of the Bible, this concern for God's freedom in his 
creative activity is expressed in the concept of the Divine word which 
brin s about its effect in the most effortless way. In each creative act, God's 
freecfom brings forth something new sim ly by His word. Therefore the 
history of the world is seen as an irreversib I'e sequence of contingent events, 
notwithstanding all the regularities that can be observed in its course. 
Consequent1 a concept of evolution in terms of a purely mechanical 
process wou ? d not be easy to reconcile with the Biblical idea of God's 
creative activity, while the concept of an epigenetic process of evolution 
with somethin new occurring in virtually every single event is perfectly 
compatible wit k it. 
On the other hand, God's creative activity does not exclude the employ- 
ment of secondar causes in bringing about God's creatures. In the 6th 
century priestly d ocument on creation preserved in the first chapter of 
Genesis, the Creator tells the earth to bring forth vegetation (Gen. 1: 11). 
And again it is the earth that is called upon to produce animals, es ecially 
mammals (Gen. 1:24). If our creationist friends today would ad R ere, in 
this case, to the letter of the Bible, they could have no objection a ainst the 
emergence of organisms from inorganic matter, nor against the cf escent of 
the higher animals from those initial stages of life. In the Biblical view, 
such a mediation does not contradict the afirmation that the creatures are 
the work of God. For in the next verse it is explicitly said that God made 
the beasts and the cattle and everything that creeps u on the ground (Gen. 
1:25). Of course, the Biblical text doesn't tell anyt l!. lng about the higher 
species of animals as having evolved from lower ones. But isn't that an 
issue of secondary importance, when com ared with the question of 
whether the act of creation must be conceive i' of as an immediate action of 
God without any mediation by other creatures? This question, however, 
has been answered already. The immediacy of God's creative action with 
reference to God's creatures is not impaired by secondary causes, since their 
activity is not on the same level with that of the Creator. 
+ The case of the human being is a special one, because human persons are 
related to God in a special way. This fact is indicated by the importance of 
religion in one form or another throughout the history of the human race. 
Human self-consciousness seems closely connected with some form of 
awareness of the divine. In the Bible, this close relationship to the origin of 
the universe is expressed in the idea that the human person has been created 
in the image of God. Therefore, the human being represents the Creator's 
own self with regard to the rest of God's creation. Doesn't that require that 
the human being was created by God alone, without the cooperation of 
other, earlier creatures? In the first chapter of the Bible no such cooperation 
is mentioned. Does that mean it is excluded? 
The older report on the creation of human beings in the second chapter 
of Genesis does not justify such a suggestion, because it says that the 
human body was formed of "dust from the round" (Gen. 27). That 
seems to be roughly equivalent to the role o f t  g e earth in the first chapter 
of Genesis, when God tells the earth to bring forth plants and animals. In 
the Biblical view the human body is taken from "the earth," just as was true 
with the animals. Therefore, our body is perishable, which is to say, it will 
return to the earth. Only the human spirit is said to come directly from 
God. As the second chapter of the Bible describes it, God breathes His 
breath into the figure He formed from the dust; He "breathed into his 
nostrils the breath of life" (Gen. 2:7). Corres ondingly, with our last 
breath we return the gift of the spirit to God, as t I! e psalm says. According 
to the Gospel of Luke, Jesus quoted this psalm when he died on his cross: 
"Into thy hand I commit m spirit" (Ps. 31:5; Luke 23:46). In the 
moment of death the spirit or reath ets separated from the body, and, as 
Ecclesiastes says, the dust returns to t $ e earth, to what was, and the spirit 
returns to God who gave it" (Eccl. 12:7). 
Does that mean that we are allowed to think of the human body as 
coming from the process of evolution of animal life, but not so of the 
human soul and spirit? This could seem to be required by the older cre- 
ation story when it says that the Creator breathes the breath of life into the 
fi ure formed from clay and thereby man became a living being (Gen. 2:7). 
T \ e Hebrew term here is nefish hayah, and nefesh was often translated as 
"soul." Thus God is presented here as creating the human soul by breath- 
ing the spirit of life into the nostrils of the human body. It was from this 
sentence that the old Christian creationism of the Patristic period derived 
its theory about the origin of the human soul. While the body of each new 
individual was considered to come from the chain of propagation, each 
individual soul was believed to be added to the body by the Creator 
Himself. But this Patristic creationism presup osed an independent status B of the soul as compared to the body, an i ea that is in keeping with 
Platonism, but not with the Hebrew Scriptures. In the Old Testament 
nefesh hayah, which we translated by the term "soul," is not independent of 
the body, but rather the rinciple of its life, thou h not the origin of life 
d R f itself The ne esh is only t e continuous hunger an thirst for life. The root meaning o f t  e word is "throat." It is in constant need of the s irit of God, 
that productive breath or wind which animates the soul and t ! rough the 
I 
soul its body. The origin of life, then, is finally the divine spirit and not 
, the human soul. It is only through the spirit that the human being becomes a "living soul," as the phrase in the creation story goes. 
To be a "living soul," however, is not a distinctive prerogative of the 
human bein . Accordin to the creation story in the first chapter of B Genesis, the 'breath of li P e" is in all the animals, the beasts on the ground, 
the birds in the air (Gen. 1:30). This corresponds exactly to the idea in the 
earlier re rt on the creation of man, where God breathes the breath of life F" into the lgure of clay so that it comes alive. If the animals have the breath 
of life within themselves, although they are products of the earth which was 
summoned by the Creator to bring them forth, then there is no difference 
between this creation and the creation of the human being, with regard to 
its description as "living soul," or nefesh hayah. The difference between the 
human being and other animals is not that the human being has a "living 
soul," but that it is destined to exist in a particular relationship to God, so 
that it is called on to represent the Creator Himself with regard to the 
animal world and even with regard to the earth (Gen, 1:26). 
The excursion into Biblical exegesis was necessary to meet the charge of 
modern creationists that the doctrine of evolution, and especially the 
derivation of the emergence of the human race from the evolutionary 
process of animal life, contradicts the biblical creation stories. When in the 
Bible animal life is seen as a product of the earth, and the formation of 
human life as "livin soul" is understood as analogous to animal life, then I there is no reason w y the human being should not have emer ed from the 
evolution of animal Iife. The idea of evolution as such is a mo 8 ern concept 
and cannot be derived from Biblical conceptions. But it is not opposed to 
the basic concerns of the Biblical conceptions of the origin of animal life 
and of human life. This can be affirmed as long as the modern idea of 
evolution does not exclude the creative divine activity within the entire 
process of evolution. 
The doarine of evolution is open to a theological interpretation when it 
is conceived not in terms of a mechanical process (based on the principle of 
natural selection), but as describing a process of emergence, in the course of 
which the roductivity of life continuously produces something new, The 
element o ! contingency in this concept of emergent evolution secures its 
openness to the creative activity of God in this process. That each form of 
life can be understood as a creature of God is not dependent on the idea of 
purpose, the assumption of a purposehl adaptation of each species to the 
conditions of its survival in its environment. In earlier times it was assumed 
that such pur osehl adaptation presupposes and demonstrates the intelli- R gent will o f t  e Creator and is not reducible to other causes. It was this 
assumption that Darwin destroyed by explaining the adaptation of a species 
to its environment as a result of natural selection. But the theory of 
natural selection need not exclude the continuous activity of the Creator in 
the very productivity of life. The notion of the superabundant creativity of 
life is not an alternative to the creative action of God any more than is the 
productivity of the earth, which, in the Biblical creation story, is called 
upon by God to bring forth vegetation and even animals. The spontaneous 
creativity of life is the form of God's creative activity. 
In a modern perspective, self-organization is characteristic of life at all 
levels of evolution. It accounts for s ontaneity in all forms of life, and it is 
in this principle of spontaneous sel /' -organization that we have to perceive 
the roots of human subjectivity. Self-organization is the principle of free- 
dom and of superabundance in the creative advance of the evolutionary 
process. Human self-consciousness is its highest manifestation so fir as we 
can see, as it allows us to integrate all other consciousness into the unity of 
our individual selves. Self-consciousness itself is not a given fact, however. 
In each individual life history it arises from the early st es of the develop- 
ment of our consciousness. Self-consciousness itself is a ? ready a product of 
the creativity of life within each one of us, a product of the creative 
activity of the divine spirit. 
The creative self-organization of life in the process of evolution from 
inorganic matter to the first or anisms, corresponds to the blowing of the 
divine wind, the spirit of God t E at breathes life into ever new creatures and 
thus blows through the evolution of life until it overcomes all perishable- 
ness in the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The death of individuals is due, 
according to the Biblical witness, to their limited share in the divine spirit 
(Gen. 63). To Jesus, however, though a finite being himself, the spirit of 
life was given "without measure" (John 3:34). Therefore he was raised 
from the dead by the power of the spirit and transformed into a spiritual 
body (1 Cor. 15:44sqq.), which is to say, into imperishable life, which is 
im erishable because of its unbroken participation in the divine spirit who 
is t R e source of all life. 
A Christian account of the evolution of life as expression of the divine 
s irit blowing through His creation cannot abstain from some reference to 
t E e eschatological resurrection of the dead, the climax of the creative activ- 
ity of the divine spirit that was first realized in the resurrection of Jesus. 
This climactic resurrection is meant to embrace human beings in general 
by communion with Jesus and even, according to Paul, the world of other 
creatures, because "creation itself will be set free from its bondage of decay 
and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Romans 8:21). 
